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TAMING THE GREEN MARKETING MONSTER: 
NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
MARKETING CLAIMS 
Glenn I srael* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Manufacturers l often advertise the superior environmental quali-
ties of their products. For example, manufacturers advertise alu-
minum cans as recyclable and appliances as energy efficient. Many 
people refer to this technique as "green marketing." The number of 
products with green marketing claims on their labels more than 
doubled between 1989 and 1990.2 During that same year, manufac-
turers' use of green marketing claims in television and print adver-
tising more than quadrupled.3 By 1995, products marketed with 
green claims could reach an annual sales figure of $8.8 billion. 4 
This rapid expansion of green marketing is a reaction by manu-
facturers to the proliferation of so-called "green consumers," who 
consider the environmental impact of a product when they make a 
purchasing decision. American consumers overwhelmingly have in-
dicated not only that they prefer to buy environmentally "friendly" 
products, but that, in most cases, they are willing to pay more for 
those products. 5 American businesses have responded quickly to this 
• Executive Editor, 1992--93, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 The term "manufacturer," as used in this Comment, refers to all of the businesses involved 
in the distribution of consumer products, including manufacturers, wholesalers, distributors, 
retailers and advertising agencies. 
2 Selling Green, CONSUMER REPORTS, Oct. 1991, at 687. 
3 [d. 
4 Hubert H. Humphrey III, Making Sure Green Claims Aren't Gray, ENVTL. F., Nov.-
Dec. 1990, at 32. 
5 See 137 CONGo REC. S3034 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1991) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg); 
Judann Dagnoli, Green Buys Taking Root, ADVERTISING AGE, Sept. 3, 1990, at 27; Selling 
Green, supra note 2, at 688. 
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consumer preference with new and improved products and with new 
green claims for existing products. 6 
Green marketing has a positive impact on the environment because 
it provides green consumers with the information they need to make 
environmentally sound purchasing decisions. Green marketing also 
raises the environmental awareness of non-green consumers and 
encourages manufacturers to produce more environmentally sound 
products. Green marketing loses much of its value, however, if con-
sumers cannot readily distinguish between environmentally prefer-
able products and those marketed with misleading or exaggerated 
green claims. 7 The free market system can have a positive effect on 
the environment only if manufacturers provide consumers with ac-
curate information about the environmental impact of their purchas-
ing decisions.8 
Due to the current lack of standardization and regulation of green 
claims, manufacturers are tempted to make green marketing claims 
that are trivial, confusing, misleading, or even deceptive.9 Because 
green marketing is a powerful, but easily misused, marketing tool, 
both government and private entities are likely to subject green 
claims to increasing legal scrutiny in the next few years. 10 
This scrutiny has already begun. In the spring of 1990, the Na-
tional Association of Attorneys General adopted a resolution calling 
for national environmental marketing standards to guide them in 
enforcing their state deceptive trade practices laws. ll In February 
1991, a group of manufacturers and retailers submitted a petition to 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) requesting uniform guidelines 
for environmental claims. 12 Their aim was to promote competition 
among manufacturers to produce environmentally superior products 
6 See 137 CONGo REC. 83034 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1991) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg). 
7 See id. 
S NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, AD Hoc TASK FORCE ON ENVIRON-
MENTAL ADVERTISING, THE GREEN REPORT II: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESPONSIBLE EN-
VIRONMENTAL ADVERTISING, at v [hereinafter GREEN REPORT II]. See also 137 CONGo REC. 
S3035 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1991) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg). 
9 See 137 CONGo REC. S3035 (dailyed. Mar. 12, 1991) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg); David 
J. Freeman, Environmental Product Claims Invite New Scrutiny, Litigation, NAT'L L.J., 
June 3, 1991, at 18. 
10 Freeman, supra note 9, at 18. 
11 NAAG Urges National Strategy On Energy Slwrtages, Environmental Marketing 
Claims, 58 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 424 (Mar. 22, 1990). 
12 Manufacturers, Retailers Petition FTC to Adopt Uniform Labeling Guidelines, 60 An-
titrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 279 (Feb. 21, 1990). 
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instead of relying on imaginative green claims for existing products. 13 
In July 1991, the FTC held public hearings to discuss the need for 
green marketing guidelines and the form that those guidelines should 
takeY In July of 1992, the FTC issued its green marketing guide-
lines. 15 
In March 1991, the attorneys general of New York and Minnesota 
joined environmental and consumer groups to support passage of 
the Federal Environmental Marketing Claims Act of 1991, which 
would establish a national regulatory scheme for environmental mar-
keting claims. 16 This bill was introduced in the Senate but has not 
yet been acted upon. Despite agreement among many of the inter-
ested parties17 that national uniform regulation of green marketing 
claims is necessary, the federal government has only just begun to 
effectuate this goal. 18 
This Comment analyzes the existing and proposed approaches that 
could be taken by federal, state, and private entities to regulate 
green marketing claims. Section II of this Comment examines the 
nature and impact of the problem that unregulated environmental 
marketing claims create. Section III discusses the traditional causes 
of action that federal, state, and private entities have brought to 
bear on this problem. In Section IV, this Comment focuses on new 
remedies designed specifically to address misleading green market-
ing claims. Finally, in Section V, this Comment analyzes the 
strengths and weaknesses of each of the existing and proposed 
schemes to regulate green marketing claims. 
13Id. 
14 56 Fed. Reg. 24,969 (1991). 
15 Guides for the Use of Environmental Claims, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,363-68 (1992) (to be codified 
at 16 C.F.R. § 260) [hereinafter FTC Guides]. 
16 The Environmental Marketing Claims Act of 1991 mandates minimum standards for 
products marketed with particular environmental claims, provides the means for developing 
and enforcing those standards, and establishes a consumer education program. S. 615, 102d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). 
17 Parties that have expressed support for the Environmental Marketing Claims Act of 1991 
include; the Minnesota and New York State Attorneys General, the Environmental Defense 
Fund, Environmental Action, Inc., the Natural Resources Defense Council and Consumers 
Union. 137 CONGo REC. S3038-39 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1991). Parties that support FTC action 
to regulate environmental marketing claims include; the Minnesota and New York State 
Attorneys General, the National Food Processors Association, the Grocery Manufacturers 
Association, the Cosmetic, Toiletry and Fragrance association, the Environmental Defense 
Fund and the Green Cross Certification Company. Hearings on Environmental Marketing 
Issues Before the Federal Trade Commission at 30, 36, 66, 140, 169 [hereinafter FTC Hear-
ings]. 
18 See Felix Kent, Advertising Law, Green Marketing, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 22,1991, at 3. 
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II. THE NATURE AND IMPACT OF UNREGULATED GREEN 
MARKETING CLAIMS 
A. Nonsubstantive and Unsupported Claims 
N onsubstantive claims have become prevalent in green market-
ing. 19 Nonsubstantive green claims are technically accurate but mis-
leading assertions that do not provide any real information about a 
product's environmental impact.2O For example, a claim that a plastic 
product saves trees is true but misleading. A consumer might infer 
from this claim that because a plastic product saves trees it has no 
adverse impact on the environment. Plastic products do have an 
adverse environmental impact, however, because they are made 
from petroleum, which like trees is a scarce resource. 21 
Manufacturers make another type of nonsubstantive claim when 
they advertise a product's environmental virtue to create the per-
ception that the manufacturer has recently modified or improved the 
product.22 For example, a manufacturer makes a nonsubstantive 
claim by labeling paper cups as containing no chlorofluorocarbons 
(CFCs).23 This claim is true but irrelevant because manufacturers' 
use of CFCs was never an issue in the production of paper cups. 24 
N onsubstantive claims allow manufacturers falsely to imply that 
their products benefit the environment by shrouding their claims in 
technically true statements. 
Unsupported green claims are those that the advertiser cannot 
substantiate with adequate scientific evidence.25 The problem of un-
supported claims is not unique to green marketing. Both federal and 
state consumer protection laws require manufacturers to support all 
marketing claims with tests or studies that meet generally accepted 
scientific standards.26 Although green claims present some special 
testing and substantiation problems,27 existing consumer protection 
laws enable the government to enforce marketing claim substantia-
19 GREEN REPORT II, supra note 8, at 27. 
20 See id. at 27-28. 
21 See id. at 28. 
22 [d. at 5-6. 
23 Congress banned the use of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), the biggest culprits in the de-
pletion of the ozone layer, in aerosol sprays in 1978 and they have since been eliminated from 
polystyrene foam products, like styrofoam cups, as well. Selling Green, supra note 2, at 690. 
24 See id. 
25 See GREEN REPORT II, supra note 8, at 29. 
26 [d.; see also FTC Policy Statement Regarding Advertising Substantiation, appended to 
Thompson Medical Co., 104 FTC 648, 839-40 (1984). 
27 See infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text. 
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tion requirements without the need for new regulations specifically 
addressing green claims. 
B. Vague Claims 
In addition to non substantive and unsupported claims, manufac-
turers often make vague environmental marketing claims that con-
fuse consumers. For example, a vague term like "environmentally 
friendly" indicates that a product has some substantive environmen-
tal advantages. The term is not specific enough, however, to provide 
consumers with any meaningful information about those advan-
tages. 28 
Similarly, manufacturers often use the term "recycled," which 
does not have a uniformly accepted definition, to refer to many 
different types of materials from which a product may be made.29 
Such vague terminology increases consumer confusion and limits the 
value of green consumerism. 30 Without accurate information, con-
sumers cannot intelligently distinguish among products and cannot 
support manufacturers that produce environmentally sound prod-
uctS. 31 Additional varieties of vague and misleading green claims 
include claims that do not distinguish between the attributes of a 
product and its packaging,32 and comparative claims, such as "better 
for the environment," that do not specify any basis for their com-
parison. 33 Because manufacturers often use vague terminology, many 
28 GREEN REPORT II, supra note 8, at 4. 
29 Manufacturers use the term "recycled" to refer to products made from post-consumer 
waste, that is, household waste that has been removed from the waste stream and recycled 
by consumers. Manufacturers also use the term to refer to products made from pre-consumer 
waste, materials that have been removed from the waste stream and recycled by manufac-
turers. In addition, manufacturers use the term "recycled" to refer to "reclaimed" materials, 
which are factory scraps that are routinely recycled back into the manufacturing process. To 
further complicate matters, many recycled products contain a combination of all of these types 
of material. See GREEN REPORT II, supra note 8, at 8-11. 
30 See GREEN REPORT II, supra note 8, at 8-9. 
31 See id. 
32 A county recycling official testified at a public forum in Minnesota about an incident that 
illustrates what can happen when a manufacturer fails to distinguish the green claims it makes 
about a product from those it makes about the product's packaging. A consumer purchased a 
package of disposable diapers. The diapers were packed in a recyclable plastic bag bearing 
the label "RECYCLABLE-This plastic softpac is recyclable where plastic bag recycling 
facilities exist." The consumer, mistakenly assuming that the diapers as well as the packaging 
were recyclable, arrived at the local recycling center with a plastic bag full of dirty diapers. 
GREEN REPORT II, supra note 8, at 8. 
33 GREEN REPORT II, supra note 8, at 11. 
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consumers misunderstand even technically true green claims that 
provide them with some substantive information. 34 
C. The Impact of Limited Consumer Knowledge 
A green claim that is technically true and clearly stated may still 
lead consumers to draw mistaken inferences because of the consum-
ers' limited understanding of complex environmental issues. 35 Mar-
keting claims such as "degradable" or "recyclable" are likely to pro-
mote the misconception that a product so labeled actually will 
degrade or be recycled. A product designed to degrade under con-
trolled conditions will not necessarily do so under the conditions of 
a typical landfill. 36 Similarly, although almost any material can be 
recycled,37 a given item's recyclability depends not on what its label 
says but on the technical and economic feasibility of providing col-
lection, separation, and recycling facilities. 38 
Limited consumer knowledge also is a central issue in the debate 
over manufacturers' use of "product life-cycle analysis" to compare 
the environmental virtues of competing products. Life-cycle analysis 
attempts to quantify a product's total environmental impact, from 
the selection of raw materials through manufacturing, sale, use, and 
disposal. 39 Advocates of life-cycle-based green marketing assert that 
consumers who purchase products based on a single green marketing 
claim, such as "recycled," may not realize the full environmental 
impact of those purchases. For example, because of the process used 
in bleaching recycled paper, a facial tissue made from 100% recycled 
material actually may have more adverse environmental effects than 
one that contains some non-recycled material. 40 
On the other hand, opponents of life-cycle-based green claims 
caution that consumers should not rely upon these types of claims 
until scientists improve the accuracy of testing methods. 41 Two re-
cent life-cycle studies, one commissioned by the disposable diaper 
industry and one by cloth diaper supporters, reached opposite con-
clusions as to which product has less overall impact on the environ-
34 See Freeman, supra note 9, at 18. 
35 See GREEN REPORT II, supra note 8, at 4. 
36 Freeman, supra note 9, at 18. 
37 [d. 
38 GREEN REPORT II, supra note 8, at 26 n.9. 
39 Selling Green, supra note 2, at 691. 
40 Green Cross Seal of Approval to be Based on Life-Cycle Cost, ENv'T TODAY, Oct. 1991, 
at 39. 
41 See GREEN REPORT II, supra note 8, at 11-12. 
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ment.42 Even the experts do not agree on which, if any, ofthe current 
methods of analyzing product life-cycles is reliable. 43 As a result of 
this confusion, some groups are calling for a moratorium on the use 
of life-cycle claims in green marketing,44 while other groups proclaim 
that life-cycle analysis is the only accurate method of determining a 
product's environmental impact.45 
Because green marketing claims are loosely regulated, manufac-
turers make claims that often do not provide consumers with any 
useful information and sometimes are totally deceptive. This amal-
gam of fact and fiction already has led many consumers to dismiss 
green claims as pure advertising hype.46 Lack of regulation decreases 
competition among manufacturers to produce better, more environ-
mentally sound products and increases consumer confusion. 47 In the 
long run, if consumers cannot rely upon green marketing claims, 
these claims will cease to have any effect on consumers' purchasing 
decisions and manufacturers will stop making them.48 This will 
greatly limit the positive effect of green consumerism on the envi-
ronment. 
Manufacturing, government, and public interest groups have sug-
gested many schemes to avoid this decline in the credibility of green 
marketing. Some groups advocate the application of existing decep-
tive advertising regulations to green marketing, while other groups 
favor developing new laws to regulate green marketing claims. 
III. THE ApPLICATION OF EXISTING CAUSES OF ACTION TO 
GREEN CLAIMS 
A. Federal Deceptive Trade Practice Laws 
Through the Federal Trade Commission Act,49 Congress has em-
powered the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to prevent unfair 
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts in commerce. 
The FTC and the courts have interpreted this power to include the 
authority to regulate false and misleading advertising and marketing 
42 Penelope Wang, Going for the Green, MONEY, Sept. 1991, at 10l. 
43 See id. at 101-02; GREEN REPORT II, supra note 8, at 12 n.4. 
44 See GREEN REPORT II, supra note 8, at 11; Selling Green, supra note 2, at 69l. 
45 See Green Cross Seal of Approval to be Based on Life-Cycle Cost, supra note 40, at 39. 
46 It's Not Easy Being Green, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 19, 1990, at 5l. 
47 See Freeman, supra note 9, at 18. 
48 See Kent, supra note 18, at 3. 
49 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1988). 
310 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 20:303 
claims. 50 The FTC has developed three Policy Statements that pro-
vide advertisers and consumers with a guide to the Commission's 
analysis of claims of unfair competition through advertising. These 
Policy Statements, which are based on case precedent, divide false 
advertising claims into three categories: deceptive claims, 51 unsub-
stantiated claims,52 and unfair methods of competition. 53 
A deceptive claim is one that is likely to mislead reasonable con-
sumers to change their conduct with regard to a particular product 
or service. 54 A claim can be entirely true yet still be deceptive if it 
misleads the reasonable consumer to infer alternative meanings that 
are not true. 55 For example, in American Home Products Corp. v. 
FTC, the court found that an advertisement inviting consumers to 
see whether "medically-proven" Anacin would "work better" for 
them was deceptive. 56 The manufacturer had medically-proven that 
Anacin contained more aspirin than other nonprescription analgesics 
and that Anacin was as effective as the leading prescription anal-
gesic. 57 The manufacturer, however, had never medically-proven 
that Anacin worked better than any other analgesic. 58 The court 
explained that although the advertisement was technically true and 
did not state specifically that Anacin was medically-proven to work 
better, the advertisement was deceptive because a reasonable con-
sumer would be likely to infer that Anacin was medically-proven to 
work better. 59 
Manufacturers must substantiate all marketing claims, express or 
implied, that make objective assertions about a product or service. 60 
To determine whether an advertiser has provided adequate substan-
tiation for a claim, the FTC balances the burden on manufacturers 
of substantiating a claim against the harm to consumers that might 
50 See FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112 (1937); Charles of The Ritz Distrib. Corp. 
v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944). 
51 Federal Trade Commission Policy Statement on Deception, appended to Cliffdale Assocs., 
Inc., 103 FTC 110, 174 (1984). 
52 Federal Trade Commission Statement Regarding Advertising Substantiation, appended 
to Thompson Medical Co., 104 FTC 648, 839 (1984). 
53 Federal Trade Commission Unfairness Policy Statement, appended to International Har-
vester Co., 104 FTC 949 (1984). 
54 56 Fed. Reg. 24,968 (1991); see also Southwest Sunsites, Inc. v. FTC, 785 F.2d 1431, 
1435 (9th Cir. 1986). 
55 American Home Prod. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681,687 (3d Cir. 1982). 
56 695 F.2d 681, 690 (1982). 
57Id. at 689. 
58 Id. 
59Id. at 690. 
60 56 Fed. Reg. 24,968 (1991). 
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result from a false claim.61 The FTC considers six factors when 
deciding whether a manufacturer has adequately substantiated a 
marketing claim: the type of claim, the type of product, the conse-
quences of a false claim, the benefits of a truthful claim, the cost of 
developing substantiation for the claim, and the amount of substan-
tiation experts in the field believe is reasonable. 62 
In addition to prohibiting deceptive and unsubstantiated claims, 
the FTC Act also prohibits marketing claims that are unfair. 63 To 
determine whether a claim is unfair, the FTC considers whether the 
claim has caused a consumer to suffer a substantial detriment-such 
as an economic loss or the purchase of a poor quality product-that 
the consumer could not have reasonably avoided. The FTC then 
balances the consumer's injury against any benefit to the market-
place that the claim generates. 64 These three categories of false 
advertising claims enable the FTC to act proactively against decep-
tive or unsubstantiated claims that have not yet caused any injury 
to consumers, as well as retroactively against unfair claims that have 
caused consumer injury. 
The FTC has three methods by which it may exercise its authority 
to prohibit false advertising claims. 65 The Commission may prosecute 
purveyors of false advertising on a case-by-case basis. 66 The FTC 
also may issue interpretive guidelines that suggest how to avoid 
running afoul of the FTC Act, but are not enforceable. 67 Finally, the 
FTC may issue enforceable "trade regulation rules," codifying their 
interpretation of the FTC Act. 68 
In addressing false advertising claims, the FTC prefers to enforce 
the FTC Act on a case-by-case basis. 69 When it learns of a false 
advertising claim, the Commission formally charges the manufac-
turer making the false claim and settles the matter either by entering 
into a consent agreement with the manufacturer or by issuing a 
cease and desist order which the manufacturer may appeal in federal 
court. 70 To date, enforcement actions targeting misleading environ-
mental marketing claims have resulted in a number of consent agree-
61 See 56 Fed. Reg. 24,969 (1991). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 56 Fed. Reg. 24,968 (1991). 
66 Id. 
67Id. 
68 Id. 
69 56 Fed. Reg. 24,969 (1991). 
70 See id. 
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ments in which manufacturers have promised to modify their adver-
tising to comply with the FTC's suggestions but have admitted no 
liability or wrongdoing. 71 
For example, in late 1990 and early 1991, the FTC charged Zi-
patone, Inc., an artists' materials manufacturer, and Jerome Russell 
Cosmetics U. S. A., Inc., a cosmetics manufacturer, with making false 
claims about the environmental safety of their aerosol products. 72 
Both manufacturers claimed that their aerosol products contained 
propellants that were safe for the environment. 73 Although neither 
manufacturer's product contained CFCs-no great accomplishment 
given that Congress banned the use of CFCs in aerosols in 197874-
the products did contain other ozone-depleting ingredients. 75 Zipa-
tone and Jerome Russell each agreed not to make any further claims 
of environmental safety for any product that contains an ozone-
depleting substance without prior substantiation of the claim, but 
neither manufacturer admitted any liability or wrongdoing. 76 
B. State Deceptive Trade Practices Laws 
Most states have enacted deceptive trade practices statutes mod-
eled after the FTC Act. 77 These "little FTC acts" allow states to 
obtain injunctions, civil fines, and criminal penalties against purve-
yors of misleading advertising. 78 Some of these statutes also allow 
misled consumers to proceed directly against manufacturers to re-
cover damages and attorneys' fees. 79 
In mid-1990, the state attorneys general began to enforce their 
little FTC acts vigorously against misleading green claims. Most 
likely, this enforcement was a reaction to the FTC's heightened 
71 See 56 Fed. Reg. 24,969 & n.9 (1991). See generally Stephen Gardner, How Green Were 
My Values: Regulation of Environmental Advertising Claims, 23 U. TOL. L. REV. 31 (1991). 
72 Gardner, supra note 71, at 51. 
73 See Id. 
74 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
75 Gardner, supra note 71, at 51. 
76 See id. 
77 See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17500-09 (West 1987); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, 
§ 2 (1987); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63(12) (McKinney Supp. 1992); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349-50 
(McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1992); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.41-17.826 (West 1987 & 
Supp. 1992). 
78 See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § § 17535, 17535.5, 17536 (West 1987); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS. ch. 93A, § 4 (1990); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 350d (McKinney Supp.1992); TEX. Bus. 
& COM. CODE § 17.47 (West 1987). 
79 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 9 (1990); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAWS § 350(e) (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1992); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE § 17.49 (West 1987). 
1993] GREEN MARKETING 313 
interest in misleading green claims.80 Some manufacturers, however, 
suggest that political aspirations,81 or a desire to dictate national 
policy82 motivated the state attorneys general to take action against 
green claims. 
Unlike the FTC Act, which the Commission enforces through 
uniform national trade regulations and guidelines, little FTC acts 
are interpreted and enforced independently by each state. Many 
state statutes, however, track the language of the FTC Act and 
defer to the Commission's interpretation of the FTC Act for guid-
ance. 83 In the past, when a number of state attorneys general have 
sensed the need for additional guidance to deal with a particular 
deceptive trade practice, the National Association of Attorneys Gen-
eral (NAAG) has produced multistate guidelines for the enforcement 
of little FTC acts. 84 The N AAG has developed multistate guidelines 
for green marketing that enable manufacturers and state attorneys 
general to determine whether a green claim violates state deceptive 
trade practices laws. 85 
In May 1991, the NAAG published its green marketing guidelines 
in the Green Report II.86 The report contains general recommenda-
tions calling for environmental claims to be specific, substantive and 
well supported, along with explicit recommendations for the appro-
priate use of terms such as "recycled," "compostable," and "degrad-
able."87 The guidelines facilitate the uniform application of state 
deceptive trade practices laws by attorneys general in all states. 
They also provide guidance to manufacturers that distribute prod-
ucts in a wide geographic area and want to ensure that their green 
claims do not violate state laws. 
80 See Gardner supra note 71, at 35; Don J. DeBenedictis, Protecting Consumers, ABA J., 
Oct. 1990, at 38. 
81 Jerry Taylor, Bossy States Censor Green Ads, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 1991, at A12. 
82 Protecting Consumers, supra note 80, at 38. 
83 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 2(b) (West 1990); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE 
§ 17.46(c)(I) (West 1987). 
84 Gardner, supra note 71, at 54. 
85 In November of 1989, the Attorneys General of California, Florida, Massachusetts, Min-
nesota, Missouri, New York, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington and Wisconsin formed an 
ad hoc task force to study the problem of unregulated green marketing claims. In November 
of 1991 the task force issued The Green Report: Findings and Preliminary Recommendations 
for Responsible Environmental Advertising. After input from manufacturers, consumers and 
environmental groups, The Green Report was modified by the task force and re-released in 
May of 1991 as The Green Report II: Recommendations for Responsible Environmental 
Advertising. See GREEN REPORT II, supra note 8, at v-vii. 
86 See id. 
87 See id. at 4-30. 
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To date, state attorneys general have brought virtually all decep-
tive green claims enforcement actions as multistate, cooperative 
actions. 88 Most of these actions have resulted in settlements rather 
than orders or judgments.89 For example, multistate investigations 
of Mobil Oil Corporation's claim that their Hefty trash bags were 
degradable and Procter and Gamble Company's claim that their 
Pampers and Luvs disposable diapers were compostable each re-
sulted in a settlement agreement. 90 Both manufacturers agreed not 
to make environmental marketing claims for their products without 
prior substantiation and to reimburse the states for the cost of 
conducting the investigation. 91 
Cooperative prosecution of misleading green claims is necessary 
because the national scope of many green marketing campaigns, 
combined with the size and vast resources of the manufacturers 
involved, makes independent state-by-state prosecution very ineffi-
cient. 92 Moreover, cooperative prosecution is simply a natural exten-
sion of the cooperative preparation of the Green Report II.93 So far, 
manufacturers have treated the settlement of state deceptive trade 
practices suits as part of the cost of doing business, but it may be 
only a matter of time before a manufacturer mounts a vigorous 
defense. 94 
C. Civil RICO Suits by Citizen Plaintiffs 
Chapter 96, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
(RICO), of the United States Code makes it illegal for any person 
to conduct an enterprise that affects interstate commerce through a 
pattern of racketeering activity,95 or to invest racketeering income 
in a business that affects interstate commerce. 96 The RICO statute 
includes a list of crimes that constitute racketeering activities. 97 The 
crimes that are relevant to deceptive green marketing claimants are 
88 Gardner, supra note 71, at 46-49. 
89 See id. 
00 Id. 
91Id. 
92 See Wayne E. Green, Lawyers Give Deceptive-Trade Statutes New Day in Court, Wider 
Interpretations, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24,1990, at Bl. 
93 Telephone interview with Andrea C. Levine, Assistant Attorney General, New York 
Attorney General's Office (Jan. 8, 1992). 
94 See Gary Taylor, AGs Police Environmental Ads, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 28, 1991, at 3. 
95 18 U.S.C § 1962(c) (1988). 
96 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988). 
97 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988). 
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mail fraud98 and wire fraud. 99 The United States can bring a criminal 
action under RICO,l°O or any person whose business or property has 
been injured by a RICO violation can bring a civil RICO action. 101 
The remedies available to a civil RICO plaintiff include injunctions,t02 
treble damages, and reasonable attorneys' fees. 103 
RICO's stated purpose is to eradicate organized crime by provid-
ing new methods to deal with unlawful activities. 104 The United 
States Supreme Court adopted a broad view of RICO's applicability 
when it decided Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc. in 1985.105 In 
Sedima the plaintiff, one party in a joint business venture, alleged 
that the other party in the joint venture had violated RICO by 
systematically overbilling for services it rendered to the plaintiff. 106 
The United States district court dismissed the case and construed 
the RICO statute to permit civil actions only in cases where the 
defendant had already been convicted of some criminal activity. 107 
The court of appeals upheld the district court's decision.108 The Su-
preme Court reversed, and condoned an unbridled application of 
RICO by civil plaintiffs, noting that only Congress could limit the 
broad language of the statute. 109 
In a typical application of RICO to deceptive advertising, the 
plaintiff claims that the advertiser committed mail or wire fraud by 
deceptively advertising a product. 110 This activity is alleged to violate 
RICO for one of two reasons: because the advertising itself consti-
tutes conducting a business that affects interstate commerce through 
a pattern of racketeering activity; or because the reinvestment of 
the profits from the sale of the advertised product constitutes an 
investment of racketeering income in a business that affects inter-
98 See 18 u.s.c. § 1341 (1988). 
99 See 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1988). 
100 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988). 
101 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988). 
102 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1988). 
103 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988). 
104 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970). 
105 See 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985). 
100 [d. at 484. 
107 [d. 
lOS [d. at 485. 
109 [d. at 499. 
110 See, e.g., Bauder v. Ralston Purina Co., Nos. Civ. A. 89-6513, 89-6591, 1989 WL 143283 
at *1-4 (E.D. Pa., Nov. 22, 1989); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 
1990 WL 107428 at *14 (W.D. Pa.); Long Island Lighting Co. v. General Elec. Co., 712 F. 
Supp. 292, 297 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). 
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state commerce. 111 For example, in Bauder v. Ralston Purina Co., 112 
the plaintiff alleged that the Ralston Purina Company had violated 
RICO by making false claims in advertisements for its Puppy Chow 
dog food, and then investing the profits from the sale of Puppy Chow 
in the ongoing operation of the company.113 After surviving Ralston 
Purina's motion to dismiss his RICO claim, the plaintiff agreed to a 
settlement. 114 
The majority of the federal circuit courts have rejected the rein-
vestment argument made by the plaintiff in Bauder. 115 These courts 
require civil RICO plaintiffs to prove that they suffered a "special 
injury," directly caused by the defendant's investment of racketeer-
ing income in a business that affects interstate commerce. 116 This 
requirement makes it very difficult for plaintiffs to succeed in civil 
RICO suits based on false advertising. 
Similarly, to prove a violation of RICO based on conduct of a 
business through a pattern of racketeering activity, the vast majority 
of the federal circuit courts require plaintiffs to show that the person 
conducting the business is a separate entity from the business it-
self.ll7 This is also a serious obstacle to false advertising RICO suits 
because the manufacturer, its parent company, and its advertising 
agency are often deemed by the courts to have acted as one entity. 118 
So far, citizen attempts to prosecute false advertising119 and de-
ceptive green claims120 under RICO have not resulted in any judg-
ments for the plaintiffs. Despite the Supreme Court's broad reading 
of RICO, the lower federal courts have been reluctant to allow civil 
RICO actions to proliferate in these non-traditional areas. 121 
The stigma associated with a RICO conviction coupled with the 
availability of injunctive relief, treble damages, and attorneys' fees 
makes RICO a potentially powerful weapon in the fight against 
111 See, e.g., Bauder, 1989 WL 143283 at *1-4; Westinghouse, 1990 WL at *14; Long Island 
Lighting, 712 F. Supp. at 297. 
112 1989 WL 143283. 
113 I d. at *2-4. 
114 Felix H. Kent, Advertising Law, Roundup of 1990, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 28, 1990 at 3. 
m Felix H. Kent, Advertising Law, RICO Revisited, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 16, 1991, at 3. 
116 See, e.g., Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, 926 F.2d 1406, 1411 (3rd Cir. 1991); Ouakine 
v. McFarlane, 897 F.2d 75,82 (2d Cir. 1990); Grider v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 868 F.2d 1147, 
1149 (10th Cir. 1989). 
117 See B.F. Hirsch v. Enright Refining Co., Inc., 751 F.2d 628, 633 (3rd Cir. 1984); R.R. 
Brittingham v. Mobil Corp., 943 F.2d 297, 301-02 (3d Cir. 1991). 
118 See Hirsch, 751 F.2d at 633; R.R. Brittingham, 943 F.2d at 301-02. 
119 See Bauder, 1989 WL 143283 (E.D. Pa.). 
120 See R.R. Brittingham, 943 F.2d at 305. 
121 See Kent, supra note 115, at 3. 
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deceptive green claims. Citizen plaintiffs, however, have yet to re-
alize RICO's potential. 
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW METHODS OF REGULATING 
GREEN CLAIMS 
A. FTC Guidelines 
The FTC regulates deceptive advertising primarily through case-
by-case enforcement of the FTC Act. 122 The Commission also has 
the authority to issue interpretive guidelines, which are non-binding 
definitions of conduct that conforms with the FTC Act. l23 The Com-
mission usually bases these guidelines on case precedent,l24 but they 
did not follow this pattern in regulating green claims. l25 The FTC 
brought a number of enforcement actions against purveyors of de-
ceptive green claims before holding public hearings and issuing 
guidelines. 126 The FTC did not establish any case precedent, how-
ever, because all of the enforcement actions were settled by consent 
decree. 127 
In March 1990, the NAAG adopted a resolution asking the FTC 
to work together with the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) and the White House Office of Consumer Affairs 
(OCA) to develop national guidelines for green marketing claims. l28 
This resolution, together with petitions from four industry groups, 
spurred the FTC to hold public hearings in July, 1991 to discuss the 
need for green marketing guidelines and the form that these guide-
lines should take. 129 The hearings produced a wide range of propos-
als. 
122 56 Fed. Reg. 24,969 (1991). 
123 56 Fed. Reg. 24,968 (1991). 
124 Degree of Cooperation Among Federal and State En/vrcers Should Expand in 1991,60 
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 103, 105 (Jan. 24, 1991). 
126 Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Mary L. Azcuenaga Concerning Issuance of Com-
mission Guidelines on Environmental Marketing Claims, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,368-69 [hereinafter 
Dissenting Statement]; Azcuenaga Will Not Endorse FTC Role in Developing Guidelinesfor 
Green Claims, 59 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) at 777 (Nov. 22, 1990). 
126 See 56 Fed. Reg. 24,968-72 (1991); Gardner supra note 71, at 44-45. 
127 Dissenting Statement, supra note 125, at 36,368-69; Azcuenaga Will Not Endorse FTC 
Role in Developing Guidelines for Green Claims, supra note 125, at 777. 
128 Manufacturers, Retailers Petition FTC to Adopt Uniform Labeling Guidelines, 60 An-
titrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 279 (Feb. 21, 1991); NAAG Urges National Strategy on 
Energy Shortages, Environmental Marketing Claims, 58 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 
424 (Mar. 22, 1990). 
129 56 Fed. Reg. 24,969 (1991). 
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At the FTC hearings, the NAAG called for national green mar-
keting guidelines to guide state attorneys general in enforcing state 
deceptive trade practices laws. lao According to the NAAG, the FTC's 
case-by-case approach was too ponderous to-allow swift reaction to 
the emergence of new marketing strategies, such as green market-
ing.13l The NAAG proposed that the FTC adopt the association's 
proposed guidelines as set forth in the Green Report II.l32 
A group of manufacturers also criticized the FTC's case-by-case 
approach, explaining that until the Commission issues national green 
marketing guidelines, the states will enforce their little FTC acts in 
an inconsistent manner and manufacturers will not be certain that 
their green claims comply with the law. 133 The manufacturers' group 
proposed its own guidelines, which are less strict than the Green 
Report II guidelines, and encouraged the FTC to consider adopting 
them. 134 The EPA and OCA also encouraged the FTC to promulgate 
national green marketing guidelines, stating that guidelines would 
provide the consistency and direction that consumers and manufac-
turers need to decide whether a green claim is deceptive. 135 
One manufacturer testified at the FTC hearings that green mar-
keting guidelines, because they would not preempt state laws or be 
binding, would provide neither sufficient national consistency nor 
sufficient incentive for manufacturers to produce better products. 136 
That manufacturer asked the FTC to promulgate enforceable trade 
regulation rules: binding regulations that preempt state law. 137 
Another participant in the FTC hearings, a public policy think 
tank called the Reason Foundation, defended the case-by-case ap-
proach. l38 The Reason Foundation suggested that environmental 
claims regulation and environmental policy are inexorably linked. 139 
For example, an FTC definition of the term ''recyclable'' might imply 
to consumers that the FTC encourages recycling of all products 
labeled in conformity with that definition. Recycling all products that 
are recyclable is not sound environmental policy, however, because 
130 FTC Hearings, supra note 17, at 33-34. 
131 [d. 
182 56 Fed. Reg. 24,976-82 (1991). 
133 FTC Hearings, supra note 17 at 68-69. 
134 56 Fed. Reg. 24,972-76 (1991). 
136 FTC Hearings, supra note 17, at 8-17. 
136 [d. at 383-84 (statement of Mr. Rajeev Bal, Webster Industries). 
137 [d. 
138 FTC Hearings, supra note 17, at 388-94. 
139 [d. 
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some recyclable products would, based on a life-cycle analysis, do 
less harm to the environment if they were not recycled. 140 Because 
of the link between green marketing regulation and environmental 
policy, the Reason Foundation suggested that any FTC program 
regulating green claims must be flexible, in order to keep up with 
developing technology, and contextual, in order to consider the facts 
and circumstances surrounding each green claim.141 The Reason 
Foundation concluded that the most flexible and contextual approach 
currently available to the FTC is the case-by-case approach.l42 
In November 1991, FTC Commissioner Mary Azcuenaga recog-
nized the link between green claims regulation and environmental 
policy and expressed a reluctance to set environmental policy. 143 
Commissioner Azcuenaga encouraged the FTC to limit its role to 
regulating manufacturers' use of environmental marketing terms 
based on consumer understanding of those terms. l44 Commissioner 
Azcuenaga cautioned the FTC not to define specific green marketing 
terms without input and guidance from the EPA, manufacturers, 
and other experts. 145 
In October 1991, FTC Chairperson Janet Steiger stated that the 
FTC should rise to the green claims challenge and promptly issue 
green marketing guidelines. 146 On July 28, 1992 the FTC issued its 
environmental marketing guidelines. 147 The FTC guidelines contain 
general principles that apply to all environmental marketing 
claims. l48 The guidelines also contain specific guidance with regard 
to eight commonly used environmental terms. 149 The format of the 
FTC guidelines is similar to the format of the NAAG's Green Report 
II, but the FTC guidelines are considerably less stringent than those 
proposed by the NAAG. For example, the Green Report II states 
that manufacturers must disclose the percentage of pre-consumer 
140 Id. 
141Id. 
142 Id. 
143 56 Fed. Reg. 24,968 (1991); Azcuenaga Will Not Endorse FTC Role in Developing 
Guidelines for Green Claims, supra note 125, at 777. 
144 Azcuenaga Will Not Endorse FTC Role in Developing Guidelines for Green Claims, 
supra note 125 at 777. 
145Id. 
146 FTC Commissioners, Industry Plan to Meet About Guidelines on Environmental La-
beling, 23 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 11 (May 1, 1992). 
147 FTC Guides, supra note 15, at 36,363-68. 
148 Id. at 36,364-65. 
149Id. at 36,365-68. 
320 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 20:303 
and post-consumer waste contained in products marked "recy-
cled, "150 while the FTC guidelines merely state that if manufacturers 
choose to provide this information, it must be substantiated. 151 
B. State Environmental Advertising Statutes 
Most states rely on their "little FTC acts" to control deceptive 
advertising claims. 152 Many of these states defer to the FTC for 
guidance in enforcing their little FTC acts. l53 In the past, when the 
FTC has failed to address a particular type of deceptive trade prac-
tice some states have enacted statutes specifically regulating that 
conduct. For example, the state of California has statutes that reg-
ulate deceptive conduct by auto mechanicsl54 and dance studios. 155 
During 1990 and 1991, many states and municipalities became tired 
of waiting for the FTC's green marketing guidelines and imple-
mented their own environmental advertising statutes. 156 A number 
of states passed laws dealing with overly broad claims157 and with 
the use of specific terms like "recycled"l58 or "degradable. "159 The 
states that currently have laws regulating environmental advertising 
claims include New York, California, Indiana, New Hampshire, 
Rhode Island, and Maine. 160 
The California environmental advertising statute, enacted in 1990, 
is one of the oldest and most stringent. 161 California's definition of 
the term "recyclable" is so restrictive that it virtually prohibits 
150 GREEN REPORT II, supra note 8, at 8. 
151 FTC Guides § 260.7(d), supra note 15, at 36,367. 
152 See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. 
153 See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
154 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 9880-9889.20 (West 1975). 
155 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1812.5-1812.67 (West Supp. 1992). 
156 See Gardner, supra note 71, at 52-53. 
157 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-5-17-2(a), 24-5-17-12 (Burns Supp. 1991); CAL. Bus. & 
PROF. CODE § 17580 (West Supp. 1992) (these statutes require documentation of the validity 
of claims such as "environmentally friendly" or "green product"). 
158 N. Y. COMPo CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 368.2 (1986) (these regulations set standards for 
use of the terms "recycled," "recyclable," and ''reusable''); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-5-17-3, 24-
5-17-10 (Burns Supp. 1992); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17508.5 (West Supp. 1992) (these 
statutes set standards which products must meet before they can be labeled with terms such 
as "recycled," "biodegradable," or "ozone friendly"). 
159 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-18.14-1-23-18.14-5 (1991 Supp.) (this statute prohibits manufac-
turers from labeling retail packaging materials with terms like "degradable" or "environmen-
tally safe" and prohibits the sale of "degradable" plastics). 
160 Miriam L. Siroky and Phillip D. Reed, Using 'Green' Claims in Advertising and Pack-
aging, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 21, 1991, at 1. 
161 John A. Donovan and Miriam L. Siroky, Bills Will Make 'Greening' Tougher to Show, 
L.A. DAILY J., Sept. 6, 1991 at 7. 
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manufacturers from using the term to market their products.162 Be-
fore a manufacturer can claim that its product is recyclable, the 
California statute requires that the product be "conveniently" re-
cyclable in every county in California with a population of over 
300,000 people. 163 The severity of the California statute has 
prompted a number of trade associations to sue the California At-
torney General. l64 The plaintiffs contend that the California statute 
deprives them of their first amendment right to educate the public 
about environmental issues. 165 
C. Scientific Certification of Green Claims 
The governments of Germany, Japan, and Canada each sponsor 
programs that award seals of approval to environmentally superior 
products. 166 The Federal Republic of Germany issued the first en-
vironmental seal in 1978. 167 Japan and Canada each began issuing 
seals in 1988. 168 Norway, Sweden, Finland, Austria, Portugal, and 
France all have fledgling environmental seal programs as well. 169 
These governments intend environmental seals to indicate that a 
product with a seal has less adverse impact on the environment than 
competing products. 17o 
All of the government programs use a similar procedure when 
considering products for an environmental seal. A government 
agency or an independent testing laboratory working under govern-
ment supervision identifies product categories that will be eligible 
for a seaP71-some popular categories are paper products, paints, 
construction materials, and laundry detergents. 172 Then the agency 
establishes the criteria that a product must meet to qualify for a seal 
in each category.173 The agency chooses criteria that will best mea-
162 [d. 
163 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17508.5(d) (West Supp. 1992). 
164 Felix H. Kent, Advertising Law, Addressing the Environment, N.Y.L.J., May 22,1992, 
at 3. 
165 [d. 
166 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL 
LABELLING IN OECD COUNTRIES 13 (1991) [hereinafter OECD REPORT]. 
167 [d. 
168 [d. 
169 [d. 
170 [d. at 12. 
171 [d. at 14. 
172 [d. at 71-73. 
173 [d. 
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sure the environmental impact of products in the category.174 Many 
government seal programs include public participation and comment 
in the category and criteria selection process. 175 
Once a government has established categories and criteria for 
awarding environmental seals, manufacturers may submit products 
for consideration in a particular category. If a product meets all of 
the criteria, the manufacturer may use the environmental seal when 
packaging and advertising that product. Although the award of an 
environmental seal is roughly based on a product's total environ-
mental impact, the evaluation process is not a true life-cycle analy-
sis. 176 
Governments employ environmental seal programs to educate con-
sumers, to encourage manufacturers to develop more environmen-
tally friendly products, and to improve the environment. 177 In Ger-
many, where an environmental seal program has existed since 1978, 
statistical evidence indicates that such programs help to further all 
of these goals. 178 
In the United States, two private organizations have begun issuing 
environmental seals. 179 Both seal programs attempt to provide ac-
curate information to consumers about the environmental impact of 
products, while encouraging manufacturers to develop more envi-
ronmentally sound products. l80 Both organizations support them-
selves by charging manufacturers a fee to test and certify their 
products. 181 Green Seal, based in Palo Alto, California, patterns its 
category and criteria selection methods after the German, Canadian 
and Japanese programs. l82 Green Seal will soon issue criteria for its 
first two product categories, tissue products and re-refined motor 
oil. 183 Any products that demonstrate their low environmental impact 
by meeting all of the criteria in one of these categories may bear the 
Green Seal. 
Green Cross, of Oakland, California, began its corporate life by 
taking a completely different approach to environmental seals. Green 
1741d. at 20-21. 
1751d. 
176 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
177 OECD REPORT, supra note 166, at 28. 
1781d. at 29~0. 
179 Green Cross vs. Green Seal: Dueling Eco-Labels, CONSUMER REPORTS, Oct. 1991, at 
689. 
180 FTC hearings, supra note 17, at 175, 178. 
1811d. 
182 ld. 
183 ld. 
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Cross decided that certification of single attribute environmental 
claims-such as "this product contains twenty percent post consumer 
recycled material"-would be useful and expedient. 184 Manufacturers 
that engage Green Cross to certify the accuracy of their green claims 
for a particular product are entitled to use the Green Cross on that 
product. To date, Green Cross has certified the accuracy of approx-
imately four hundred specific green marketing claims for eighty 
different manufacturers. 185 
In 1991, Green Cross announced that, like Green Seal, it will offer 
an environmental seal based on a product's overall environmental 
impact. 186 Rather than following the criteria-based method that other 
environmental seal programs use, however, Green Cross has chosen 
to use a comprehensive life-cycle analysis model. 187 This comprehen-
sive approach is designed to take into account all of the resources 
used, energy consumed, wastes created, and emissions produced by 
the manufacture, distribution, use and disposal of a product. 188 There 
are many comprehensive life-cycle analysis models in existence. Ex-
perts are not convinced, however, that any of the models, including 
the one chosen by Green Cross, is completely accurate. 189 
D. Federal Legislation 
Congress is considering two bills that would regulate environmen-
tal marketing claims. The Environmental Marketing Claims Act of 
1991 (the Lautenberg Act),I90 introduced by Senator Frank Lauten-
berg, and the Environmental Marketing Claims section of the N a-
tional Waste Reduction, Recycling, and Management Act,191 (the 
Swift Act) proposed by Representative Al Swift, contain many com-
mon elements. Both of these proposed regulatory schemes would 
attack the misleading green claims problem by requiring the EPA 
to issue regulations defining the attributes that a product must have 
184 [d. 
185 Green Cross Seal of Approval to be Based on Life Cycle Cost, supra note 40 at 39. 
185 [d. 
187 [d. The life-cycle analysis model chosen by Green Cross was developed about 20 years 
ago by Dr. Ian Boustead, an English engineering professor known as the father of product 
life cycle assessment. [d. 
188 [d. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
189 See GREEN REPORT II, supra note 8, at 11-12; FTC Hearings, supra note 17, at 169-
89; see also supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. 
190 S. 615, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). 
191 H.R. 3865, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). 
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for its manufacturer to make a particular green claim. 192 Both 
schemes would set minimum standards that the EPA must follow. 193 
For example, the Swift Act would require that the EPA regulations 
permit the use of the term "recycled" only on products or packaging 
that contain at least 25% post-consumer materials. 194 Both schemes 
also would call for the EPA to conduct a public education campaign 
to raise consumer awareness of the types of claims that would be 
regulated by the act, the way the act would regulate those claims 
and the benefits of environmental consumerism. 195 
The Lautenberg Act and the Swift Act do differ, however, in their 
methods of enforcement and the extent to which they would preempt 
state law. The Lautenberg Act would empower the EPA to impose 
civil fines on violators.196 It also would allow for enforcement by 
states or individual citizens,197 and would award attorneys' fees to 
successful citizen plaintiffs.198 The Swift Act, on the other hand, 
would categorize any violation of its provisions as an unfair and 
deceptive trade practice in violation of the FTC Act, and would rely 
on the FTC to prosecute these violations. 199 State attorneys general 
and individual citizens also presumably could pursue misleading 
green claims that violate the Swift Act by invoking their states' little 
FTC acts. 
In addressing preemption, the Lautenberg Act explicitly would 
grant the states the power to promulgate standards for green claims 
that are stricter than those set forth in the proposed EPA regula-
tions.2°O The Swift Act, on the other hand, would allow the states to 
promulgate standards only for those green claims that the EPA had 
not already regulated. 201 
192 S. 615, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(b)(I) (1991); H.R. 3865, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 4403(a) 
(1992). 
193 S. 615, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(b)(7) (1991); H.R. 3865, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 4403(e) 
(1992). 
194 H.R. 3865, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 4403(e)(I)(A)(i)(II) (1992). 
195 S. 615, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 12 (1991); H.R. 3865, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 4403(h) 
(1992). 
196 S. 615, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 9(a)(2)(A) (1991). 
197 S. 615, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § § 10, 11 (1991). 
198 S. 615, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 11(e) (1991). 
199 H.R. 3865, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 4403(c) (1992). See supra notes 49--53 and accompanying 
text. 
200 S. 615, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 13(c) (1991). 
201 H.R. 3865, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 4403(i) (1992). 
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VI. ANALYSIS OF EXISTING AND PROPOSED METHODS OF 
REGULATING GREEN CLAIMS 
A. Federal Legislation 
325 
Federal legislation that sets national standards for environmental 
marketing claims is the best way to insure the future of green 
marketing. Both of the proposed federal green marketing regulatory 
schemes-the Lautenberg Act and the Swift Act-would create uni-
form national standards for green marketing claims.202 In addition, 
both proposals would set minimum standards for products marketed 
with green claims and would direct the EPA to develop regulations 
to enforce those standards. 203 This direct congressional mandate 
would encourage manufacturers to improve the environmental at-
tributes of their products and would eliminate the FTC's concern 
over which agency has the power to set environmental policy through 
the regulation of green marketing claims. 204 
The Lautenberg Act and the Swift Act also would establish a 
consumer education program. This program would inform consumers 
of the types of green marketing claims regulated, the method of 
regulation, and the benefits of green consumerism.205 Such an edu-
cational program would reach all consumers and most likely would 
result in the growth of green consumerism. 
In addition, both the Lautenberg Act and the Swift Act contain a 
method for periodic review and revision of the EPA's green mar-
keting regulations. 206 This would insure that federal green marketing 
standards will continue to reflect the latest environmental technology 
and will encourage manufacturers to employ this technology to lessen 
the environmental impact of their products. 
The Lautenberg Act and the Swift Act share one major disadvan-
tage. The process of creating new laws generally takes much longer 
than the FTC's guideline creation process. Manufacturers pressured 
the FTC to issue green marketing guidelines in part because of their 
recent experience with federal nutritional claims legislation. 207 The 
development and passage of the Federal Nutrition Labeling and 
202 See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text. 
203 Id. 
204 See supra notes 140-47 and accompanying text. 
205 See supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
206 S. 615, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(c) (1991); H.R. 3865, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 4403(0 
(1992). 
207 John Holusha, Industry Seeks U.S. Rules Covering Environment Ads, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 15, 1991, D6. 
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Education Act of 199()20B-a bill designed to set standards for nutri-
tional marketing claims-engendered two-and-a-half years of 
congressional debate and a number of lawsuits. 209 Congress must 
develop national green marketing guidelines quickly in order to avoid 
further marketplace confusion. 
The enforcement and preemption provisions of the Swift Act make 
it a better solution to the green marketing problem than the Lau-
tenberg Act. The Lautenberg Act would charge the EPA with the 
task of enforcing green claims regulations. 21o While the EPA is best 
equipped to make the environmental policy and scientific decisions 
necessary to the development of green claims standards, the FTC 
has far more expertise in enforcing deceptive advertising regula-
tions. The Swift Act's enforcement scheme, which would use existing 
FTC and state deceptive trade practices enforcement procedures,211 
would be more effective and efficient than the Lautenberg Act. 
The Lautenberg Act also would permit states to promulgate green 
marketing regulations that are stricter than the federal regula-
tions. 212 One argument against the development of national green 
marketing guidelines has been that they would not be responsive to 
local conditions and concerns. 213 For example, a national standard 
for the use of the term "recyclable" would not address the local 
availability of recycling options in any particular city or state. The 
benefits of nationally uniform standards, however, outweigh the ben-
efits of localized standards. If states vigorously enforce a multiplicity 
of local green marketing standards, manufacturers most likely will 
refrain from making green claims at all. Pursuit of the ideal green 
marketing standard must stop short of making green marketing 
economically unfeasible. 
Furthermore, if Congress intends to set national environmental 
policy through the promulgation of minimum green marketing stan-
dards, then the uniformity of its regulatory scheme should not be 
destroyed by allowing independent state regulation. The Swift Act 
would generate uniform green marketing standards because it would 
preempt state regulation of all green marketing claims that are 
covered by the EPA regulations. 214 While both the Swift Act and 
208 21 U.S.C. 343(q) (1988 & Supp. II 1990). 
209 Holusha, supra note 207, at D6; DeBenedictis, supra note 80, at 38. 
210 See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
2n See supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
212 See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
213 See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text. 
214 See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
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the Lautenberg Act contain many good ideas, the Swift Act is the 
best proposal for federal regulation of green marketing because of 
its enforcement and preemption provisions. 
B. FTC Guidelines 
Almost all of the manufacturers, environmentalists, and politicians 
who attended the FTC's hearings on environmental marketing issues 
asked the FTC to promulgate green marketing guidelines as quickly 
as possible.215 To its credit, the FTC acted quickly to promulgate 
those guidelines. The FTC guidelines are a good first step towards 
insuring the continued credibility of green marketing claims, but 
they are not a complete solution. 
The FTC guidelines reduce the problem of undefined green mar-
keting terms, which is the primary obstacle to case-by-case enforce-
ment of the FTC Act against misleading green claims. The guide-
lines, however, are handicapped by the fact that the FTC has been 
careful not to set national environmental policy. The FTC guidelines 
contain only broad suggestions for the use of common green mar-
keting terms such as "compostable" and "recycled."216 The Swift 
Amendment would empower the EPA to set specific standards for 
the use of these terms. 
The FTC guidelines will increase the national uniformity of green 
claims regulation because most states follow FTC guidelines when 
enforcing their little FTC acts. Furthermore, when state enforce-
ment actions follow the FTC guidelines, manufacturers may be less 
likely to challenge the state enforcement as being preempted or 
unconstitutional. The FTC guidelines, however, will not provide 
absolute national uniformity because they are non-binding and do 
not preempt state laws. The Swift Act would provide a "safe harbor" 
for manufacturers that is lacking in the FTC guidelines. 
C. Case-by-Case Enforcement of Federal Deceptive Trade 
Regulations 
The current FTC policy of regulating misleading advertising 
through case-by-case enforcement of the FTC Act is already familiar 
to manufacturers and consumers and is well suited to regulating 
misleading green claims. The FTC has regulated false advertising 
215 See supra notes 128-37 and accompanying text. 
216 FTC Guides § 260.7, supra note 15, at 36365-68. 
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for many years,217 and has pursued misleading green claims for 
nearly twenty years.218 The FTC's experience regulating false ad-
vertising on a case-by-case basis has produced a relatively efficient 
bureaucracy, and its interpretive guidelines and trade regulations 
have streamlined its activities even further. 
The FTC's case-by-case approach to regulating misleading adver-
tising has the advantage of being proactive as well as retroactive. . 
The Commission does not have to show harm to consumers before 
it can censure misleading advertising claims. A deceptive advertising 
claim is illegal simply because it is likely to mislead the reasonable 
consumer. Alternatively, the FTC may choose to wait until it re-
ceives a consumer complaint before it acts, because an unfair adver-
tising claim-one that already has caused a consumer injury-is 
illegal as well. 
Another advantage of the case-by-case enforcement approach is 
its built-in system of checks and balances. If the FTC chooses not 
to enforce the FTC Act against a particular type of misleading 
advertising claim, states are free to enforce their little FTC acts. 
Conversely, if the FTC is overzealous in enforcing the FTC Act, 
manufacturers can appeal the FTC's cease and desist orders to the 
United States district courts. 
The major obstacle to the FTC's use of case-by-case enforcement 
of the FTC Act against green claims is the difficulty in applying the 
FTC standards for deception, substantiation, and unfairness to green 
claims without first defining the terms used in making those green 
claims. For example, it is impossible for the FTC to classify a prod-
uct's claim of being made from recycled material as deceptive until 
it has decided how to define the term "recycled. "219 The FTC has 
said that it will not define green marketing terms because by doing 
so the Commission would be setting environmental policy which is 
not within its power. 220 The Commission's decision to promulgate 
environmental marketing guidelines without specifically defining 
green marketing terms, however, ignores the fact that poorly defined 
green marketing terms are a principal cause of misleading green 
marketing. Until federal legislation requires specific definitions for 
green marketing terms, the Commission's case-by-case enforcement 
efforts cannot be fully effective or consistent. The FTC's environ-
217 See Charles of The Ritz Distrib. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944). 
218 See Ex-Cell-O Corp., 82 FTC 36 (1973). 
219 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
220 See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text. 
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mental marketing guidelines are a step in this direction but they are 
not specific enough to provide the needed consistency. 
D. Case-by-Case Enforcement of State Deceptive Trade 
Regulations 
Most of the states' little FTC acts defer to FTC interpretations of 
conduct that is deceptive or unfair. In this way, little FTC acts add 
a second layer of enforcement to the FTC Act. When state attorneys 
general or individual citizens enforce a state's little FTC act they 
are guided by the principles of the federal act. 
In areas such as green claims, however, where there is little 
federal guidance, states are free to consider local conditions and 
concerns when interpreting the law. State attorneys general need 
not be concerned with the national consumer understanding of the 
term "recycled" or the national availability of a recycling program 
for a particular product when they apply their little FTC acts to a 
misleading green claim. State attorneys general can reduce the task 
of regulating misleading green claims to manageable proportions 
because they only need to consider consumers in their own states. 
The flexibility of state little FTC acts, however, is both an advan-
tage and a shortcoming. Independent regulation of green claims by 
each state will lead to a multiplicity of standards, which may have a 
chilling effect on the use of green marketing claims by manufacturers 
who distribute their products over a wide geographic area. Fur-
thermore, in implementing a case-by-case enforcement approach to 
green claims regulation, the states face the same problem of unde-
fined green marketing terms that hinders the FTC's case-by-case 
enforcement efforts. The FTC's environmental advertising guide-
lines have reduced this problem somewhat, but federal legislation is 
needed to provide specific definitions for green marketing terms. 
In addition, states waste resources when they enforce their little 
FTC acts against misleading green claims made by national manu-
facturers. The standards for deception, substantiation, and unfair-
ness contained in most of the little FTC acts are the same as those 
used by the FTC. A nationwide FTC censure of a misleading green 
claim is much more efficient than individual enforcement efforts in 
each state. Similarly, each individual state has less ability to influ-
ence the behavior of large national manufacturers than the FTC. 
Case-by-case enforcement of state little FTC acts has had some 
success in curtailing misleading green marketing claims. Because of 
its shortcomings, however, state case-by-case enforcement is most 
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effective when used in conjunction with federal enforcement. In 
addition, state case-by-case enforcement of deceptive trade practices 
laws, like FTC case-by-case enforcement of the FTC Act, is most 
effective and consistent when it is based on specific definitions of 
green marketing terms. 
E. State Environmental Advertising Statutes 
State environmental advertising statutes have most of the same 
advantages and most of the same shortcomings as state little FTC 
acts. States that enact their own green marketing laws can tailor 
those laws to state environmental policies and local concerns. The 
resulting multiplicity of state green marketing standards, however, 
may have a chilling effect on national green marketing campaigns. 
The Swift Act offers a solution to this problem. Under the Swift 
Act, states would be prohibited from regulating any of the green 
marketing terms regulated by the EPA, but would be free to regu-
late all other green marketing claims. This would provide national 
uniformity while still allowing states to regulate matters of purely 
local concern. 
F. RICO 
So far, plaintiffs who have brought civil RICO suits against man-
ufacturers for making misleading marketing claims have not suc-
ceeded. 221 Although the United States Supreme Court has encour-
aged a very broad application of RICO's civil liability provisions, the 
lower courts are not receptive to creative new uses for RICO.222 
Still, the possibility that a plaintiff could prevail in a civil RICO 
claim concerning an egregious case of false advertising is something 
for manufacturers to keep in mind. 
Civil RICO suits by citizen plaintiffs can have a significant deter-
rent effect on deceptive green marketing claims. RICO's civilliabil-
ity provisions empower individual citizens to enforce their rights in 
a way that will make manufacturers take them seriously. A ~oup 
of plaintiffs seeking treble damages and attorneys' fees in a class 
action civil RICO suit can motivate a manufacturer to take action to 
address their grievances. 
221 See supra notes 115-20 and accompanying text. 
222 Id. 
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G. Environmental Seal Programs 
The two independent environmental seal organizations in the 
United States, Green Cross and Green Seal, share the same objec-
tives. Both seal programs attempt to provide accurate information 
to consumers about the environmental impact of products, while 
encouraging manufacturers to develop more environmentally sound 
products.223 Nonetheless, federal regulation of green claims, which 
also shares these objectives, protects consumers more effectively. 
Environmental seals that certify the truthfulness of specific green 
claims attempt to provide accurate information to consumers, but 
because most misleading green claims are technically true,224 inde-
pendent certification of a green claim's truthfulness is of little value 
to consumers. Green Seal, which does not certify specific green 
claims, and the NAAG have both concluded that independently cer-
tified green claims, because they appear reliable, may have more 
potential to mislead consumers than uncertified claims. 225 
Life-cycle226 and criteria-based227 environmental seal programs en-
courage manufacturers to develop better products in order to earn 
a seal. When a product earns an environmental seal by performing 
well in a life-cycle analysis or by meeting all of the criteria in a 
particular product category, the manufacturer may use that seal in 
marketing the product. These seal programs effectively encourage 
competition among manufacturers but do not always provide con-
sumers with accurate information. 
The scientific uncertainty of the life-cycle method of analysis may 
mislead consumers. Experts do not agree on which, if any, of the 
methods of life-cycle analysis produce accurate results.228 Further-
more, life-cycle-based green claims are of little use to consumers 
because consumers cannot compare competing claims bearing differ-
ent environmental seals unless the organizations granting the seals 
have used the same method of life-cycle analysis. 
Criteria-based methods of analysis face similar problems. In order 
for criteria-based seals to have any value, the criteria must accu-
rately reflect a product's impact on the environment and the orga-
nizations granting the seals must update their criteria regularly to 
223 See SU'JYM note 180 and accompanying text. 
224 See su'JyM notes 1!h'W and accompanying text. 
226 GREEN REPORT II, su'JYM note 8, at 15; FTC Hearings, SU'JYM note 17, at 179-80. 
226 See SU'JYM notes 39-40 and accompanying text. 
227 See SU'JYM notes 171-75 and accompanying text. 
228 GREEN REPORT II, SU'JYM note 8, at 11-12. 
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incorporate changing technology. Consumers cannot choose intelli-
gently between products with seals and those without them unless 
they know the criteria used in considering a product for a seal and 
the validity of those criteria. Unfortunately, consumers cannot easily 
determine the validity of environmental impact criteria. Consumers 
might judge the validity of a given set of criteria by how well a 
criteria analysis and a comprehensive life-cycle analysis of the same 
product agree, but one of the reasons criteria analysis exists is the 
lack of an accepted standard for comprehensive life-cycle analysis. 
An environmental seal organization's selection of product cate-
gories also has the potential to cause misleading results. The German 
government's aerosol deodorant category illustrates this problem. 
The German government established the aerosol deodorant category 
to reward those products that caused the least damage to the envi-
ronment, but roll-on deodorants, which as a category cause less 
environmental harm than aerosols, were not eligible for a seal. 229 
Aerosol deodorants with environmental seals might appear in stores 
next to roll-on deodorants without seals, misleading consumers to 
infer that the aerosols are better for the environment. 
Similar confusion may result from the fact that manufacturers 
must pay an independent certification organization a fee to test their 
products before the manufacturers can use that organization's en-
vironmental seal. 230 Small manufacturers or those with a limited 
market for their product may not be able to afford the expense of 
certification. When consumers compare a product with a seal with a 
competing product without a seal, they are likely to overlook these 
economic considerations and simply assume that the product with 
the seal is better for the environment. 
A related problem is the danger that consumers will overestimate 
the value of an environmental seal. Although the purpose of envi-
ronmental seals is simply to identify products that cause the least 
environmental harm, consumers might assume that any product 
bearing an environmental seal causes no harm to the environment, 
or that such a product is actually beneficial to the environment. In 
addition, there is the danger that consumers will see environmental 
seals as a panacea. Consumers might reason that by shopping care-
fully they have done their part for the environment, and stop doing 
things such as recycling and waste reduction which can have an even 
greater impact on the environment. In sum, life-cycle and criteria-
229 Hannah Holmes, Seals to Watch, GARBAGE, Sep.-Oct. 1991, at 49. 
230 See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
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based environmental seals do provide some information to consumers 
about the environmental impact of products, but they also have great 
potential to mislead. 
Environmental seal programs are more a part of the green mar-
keting problem than a part of the solution. Manufacturers can use 
environmental seals on their products as a means of making mis-
leading green claims. The presence of an environmental seal on a 
product does not assure consumers of the merit of the green claims 
made about that product because of the faults inherent in the specific 
claims, life-cycle, and criteria-based certification methods. Until sci-
entists develop an accurate method of life-cycle analysis, environ-
mental seals can provide valuable information to consumers only if 
they are regulated by the same standards as all other green claims. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Green marketing has a positive effect on the environment because 
it provides consumers with the information they need to make en-
vironmentally sound purchasing decisions. The marketplace can have 
this positive effect on the environment, however, only if manufac-
turers' green claims are legitimate and consistent. The only way to 
insure that manufacturers' green marketing claims provide useful 
information to consumers is through uniform national regulation of 
those claims. 
The FTC and the state attorneys general are committed to stop-
ping the flow of misleading green claims. The independent seal pro-
grams, Green Cross and Green Seal, are ready to substantiate and 
certify legitimate green claims. Without specific definitions for com-
monly used green terms such as "recycled" or "degradable," how-
ever, the efforts of these organizations can not be fully effective. 
The FTC environmental marketing guidelines are a good start, but 
we need federal legislation that sets minimum standards for products 
marketed with green claims and preempts state laws. 
The governments of Germany, Japan, and Canada all have pro-
grams that set minimum environmental standards for products mar-
keted with green claims. The United States should act quickly to 
join these nations that are using their free market systems to im-
prove the environment. 
